The Strategic Subsea Cables Act of 2026 addresses the growing threat of sabotage to critical undersea infrastructure, which includes both telecommunications and energy cables. Congress finds that such infrastructure is vital for United States and allied security and economic prosperity, carrying vast amounts of data and financial transfers daily. Recent incidents of damage to subsea cables and pipelines across Europe and Asia highlight the urgent need for enhanced protection and coordinated responses. The bill emphasizes the importance of United States Government leadership in international bodies like the International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC) to advance national security interests. It calls for increased diplomatic engagement to promote network resilience, redundancy, and stronger regulations. Furthermore, it urges the United States to lead efforts in enhancing situational awareness, preparedness, and formalizing collective responses among allies through improved information sharing and coordination. A key provision of the bill is the imposition of sanctions on foreign persons responsible for or facilitating acts of sabotage against critical undersea infrastructure. These sanctions include blocking property and interests in property within U.S. jurisdiction and rendering individuals ineligible for visas or admission to the United States. The President is required to report to Congress after imposing such sanctions, with certain exceptions for national security interests or law enforcement activities. The legislation mandates several detailed reports, including an annual assessment of the subsea cable manufacturing, installation, and maintenance capabilities of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation . These reports must analyze the missions and activities of entities like Russia's Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research (GUGI) and the PRC's People's Liberation Army, focusing on their capabilities for surveillance and sabotage. Additionally, the Director of National Intelligence must report on the likely cause and attribution of specific instances of reported critical undersea infrastructure sabotage, such as the Nord Stream pipeline incident and various cable damages. To bolster domestic coordination, the bill requires the establishment of an interagency committee within one year of enactment, comprising heads of appropriate Federal agencies. This committee will lead efforts to protect and improve the resilience of subsea telecommunications infrastructure, facilitate licensing and permitting, and address other related matters. It will also develop an interagency concept of operations for partnering with non-Federal entities to secure and repair infrastructure in crisis scenarios. The Department of State is directed to expand its critical undersea infrastructure-related expertise by assigning at least 10 full-time equivalent individuals, with a focus on subsea telecommunications infrastructure within the Bureau for Cyberspace and Digital Policy. This expansion aims to support the Department's interagency engagement on protection, resilience, and coordination with allies. The Secretary of State must also devote sufficient personnel and resources to engage foreign countries, reduce barriers to infrastructure maintenance, and support the development of a multinational fleet of cable repair ships. Finally, the bill strengthens information sharing between the United States Government and private sector actors involved in subsea telecommunications infrastructure. It mandates procedures for the timely sharing of classified and unclassified information regarding sabotage and potential sabotage, ensuring that non-Federal entities with necessary clearances receive critical intelligence. This enhanced collaboration aims to identify trends, refine attributions, and inform future risk mitigation efforts to protect these essential global networks.